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I. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS. 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules or regulations that are determinative of the issue on appeal. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE NO-WAIVER PROVISION IN THE PARTIES' MEMORANDUM COULD BE 
WAIVED, AND WAS IN FACT WAIVED, BY THE LESSOR'S PERIODIC 
ACCEPTANCE OF DELINQUENT RENT. 
In an effort to justify its precipitous and unexpected 
decision to forfeit the Lease Agreement, the Lessor invokes the no-
waiver provision of the Memorandum. (Appellee's Brief at 6, 13-
20.) The Lessor's reliance on that provision, however, is 
misplaced. "It is a well-established rule of law that parties to 
a written contract may modify, waive, or make new terms 
notwithstanding terms in the contract designed to hamper such 
freedom." Prince v. R. C. Tolman Const., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 
1980) (erupting Davis v. Payne & Day, 348 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 
I960)). As this court has stated, "[p]arties to a contract may, by 
mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract, even if the 
contract itself contains a provision to the contrary." Ted R. 
Brown & Assocs. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 
1988) . 
1 
The rationale for this principle is that " . . . there is 
nothing so sacrosanct about having entered into one agreement that 
it will prevent the parties entering into any such change, 
modification, extension or addition to their arrangement for doing 
business with each other that they may mutually agree." PLC 
Landscape Const, v. Picadilly Fish & Chips, Inc. , 502 P.2d 562, 563 
(Utah 1972). Thus, 
While parties to a contract are free to 
[ignore its provisions], they must also 
understand that they may bear the consequences 
of such disregard when breach becomes a fact 
of life. As a general rule, if the parties 
mutually adopt a mode of performing their 
contract differing from its strict terms, or 
if they mutually relax its terms by adopting a 
loose mode of executing it, neither party can 
go back upon the past and insist upon a breach 
because it was not fulfilled according to its 
letter. 
Ouinn Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const., 597 P.2d 945, 951 
(Wyo. 1979) (emphasis in original). 
Numerous commentators and other courts have recognized that 
contractual provisions that purport to eliminate the possibility of 
the parties' waiver are not enforceable. According to Professor 
Corbin: 
In like manner, a provision that an express 
condition of a promise or promises in a 
contract cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by 
conduct constituting an estoppel, is wholly 
ineffective. The promisor still has the power 
to waive the condition, or by his conduct to 
estop himself from insisting upon it, to the 
2 
same extent that he would have had this power 
if there had been no such provision. 
3A Corbin on Contracts, § 763, p. 531 (rev ed. 1960). 
The Utah Supreme Court endorsed this principle in Calhoun v. 
Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284 (Utah 1944). In that case, the 
parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of an 
automobile. The contract contained both a time of the essence 
provision and a no-waiver provision. Several of the buyer's 
payments during the first twelve months of the contract were made 
as much as 30 days late. After accepting the first 12 payments, 
the seller rejected the next payment on the basis that it was too 
late. Shortly thereafter, the seller repossessed the automobile 
and sought a deficiency judgment against the buyer. In affirming 
the trial court's decision that the seller had waived strict 
compliance despite the existence of the no-waiver provision to the 
contrary, the court stated "the provision that a waiver of any 
breach of the contract shall not be deemed to be a waiver of any 
subsequent failure of strict compliance with any and every term of 
the contract, as well as any other term of the contract, could be 
modified by agreement of the parties." 146 P.2d at 286 (quoting 
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Beardslee v. North Pacific Finance Corp., 296 P. 155, 158 (Wash. 
1931)).l 
Numerous other courts in a multitude of jurisdictions have 
reached the same result. Fisher v. Tiffin, 551 P.2d 1061, 1063 
(Ore. 1976) (a "non-waiver provision of the contract can itself be 
waived by the conduct of the vendor."); Sagson Co. v. Weiss, 374 
N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. 1975) ("a no waiver clause of this character 
does not apply to a claim of waiver by open possession."); Searod 
Shipping Co. v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours Co., 361 F.2d 833, 837, n.18 
(5th Cir. 1966) ("Corbin makes very clear that neither the parol 
evidence rule [citation omitted], the statute of frauds [citation 
omitted], nor express provision in the written contract against 
waiver by subsequent oral agreement or conduct [citation omitted] 
prevent the introduction of evidence that a party to the contract 
by subsequent conduct or agreement — oral or written — waived a 
condition to its performance of the contract."); Bettelheim v. 
Hagstrom Food Stores, 249 P.2d 301, 305 (Cal. 1952) (presence of 
no-waiver provision in contract can itself be waived). 
These principles belie the Lessor's assertion that "[a]ny 
inference of intent by [the Lessor] to waive its right to timely 
1
 In light of Calhoun, there is no basis for the Lessor's 
assertion that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Pacific 
Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748 (1948) ". • . is 
consistent, however, with the conclusion that such a provision 
would have been given effect." (Appelle's Brief at 15, n.10.) 
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performance of the Lease and the Memorandum is precluded by the 
existence of the no-waiver provision in the parties' agreement." 
(Appellee's Brief at 20.) Moreover, there is no evidence in the 
record to support the Lessor's suggestion that it ". . . relied on 
the above no-waiver provision in an attempt to work with [the 
Lessee] instead of immediately terminating the Lease and acting to 
evict him. . . . " Ld. In the final analysis, the no-waiver 
provision cannot be used as a type of legal alchemy to magically 
transform conduct that plainly constitutes waiver to conduct that 
the law overlooks. 
B. THE LANDLORD BOTH FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO 
INSIST ON TIMELY PAYMENTS UNDER THE LEASE AND THE MEMORANDUM. 
A party can waive its rights, or may demonstrate its intention 
to relinquish its rights, either by actions or conduct that 
evidences an intent to waive, or by actions that are inconsistent 
with any other intent. E.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food 
Service, 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah App. 1988). Whether waiver will be 
found in a particular case does not depend upon the secret 
intention of the waiving party, but on the effect its actions have 
on the other party. Jd. at 103. A party cannot prevent a waiver by 
a mental reservation to the contrary when its conduct expresses an 
intent to waive. Id.; 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 158. 
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In this case, the conduct that evidences the Lessor's waiver 
of its right to insist on strict performance is compelling• That 
conduct includes: 
(1) For the five-month period ending August 31, 1993, the 
Lessor allowed the Lessee to be an average of 55 days late in the 
payment of required rent (Trial Exh. 6). 
(2) During that five-month period, the Lessor allowed the age 
of the delinquency to accelerate from an average of 23 days, to 56 
days, to 60 days, to 80 days. Id. 
(3) Although the parties' Memorandum undeniably apprised the 
Lessee of the Lessor's contractual expectation of receiving 
payments "in full and on time," Memorandum H 2, the parties 
mutually relaxed their adherence to that requirement. Id. 
(4) There is no evidence that the Lessor ever objected to the 
Lessee's late rent payments at any time between March 1 and 
August 1, 1993.2 
2
 Although the Lessor claims that it "continually vbird-
dogged'" the Lessee to "make his payments and honor his agreement," 
see Appellee's Brief at 6, 23, the Lessor's use of the term "bird-
dogged" is a hopelessly confused and confusing means of describing 
its own conduct. Fairly viewed, the term means nothing more than 
the proposition that the Lessee closely monitored the sequence and 
timing of the Lessee's payment of rent. The term, however, does 
not connote an actual objection to the sufficiency of the Lessee's 
payment obligations. 
To the extent the Lessor now claims that the term somehow 
includes the concept of objection, that interpretation distorts the 
reality of what actually occurred. As a commercially sophisticated 
(continued...) 
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(5) When the Lessor's lawyer demanded that the Lessee bring 
the Lease Agreement "current" and do so "immediately," the Lessee 
did not pay "immediately" and did not pay in "full." Rather, 16 
days later, on August 19, 1993, the Lessee made only the delinquent 
June rent payment, rather than the two months of delinquent rent 
demanded on August 2 and August 3, 1993. 
(6) On August 20, 1993—one day after accepting the 80-day 
delinquent June rent payment—the Lessor filed its complaint to 
forfeit the Lease Agreement. 
These facts are abundant evidence of the Lessor's intent to 
waive strict performance of the rent payment obligations. They 
further demonstrate the extraordinary unfairness that would be 
imposed on the Lessee by allowing the Lessor to pull the forfeiture 
trigger without reasonable advance notice. Utah law requires the 
2( . . .continued) 
contracting party ably represented by competent legal counsel, the 
Lessor knew how to adduce evidence to establish the proposition 
that it actually objected to the Lessee's laxity in making rent 
payments on time. It failed to adduce such evidence. Even 
assuming, however, that the term "bird-dogged" can be stretched to 
include the proposition that the Lessor actually objected to the 
delinquent payments, it is still clear that after each such 
"objection," the Lessor never took any definitive action from March 
1 to August 1, 1993 to put the Lessee on notice that further late 
payments would not be tolerated and, if not rectified, would place 
the Lessee in jeopardy of forfeiture. 
Finally, a careful reading of the text and context of the 
"bird dog" reference discloses that it refers to the point at which 
the Memorandum was actually signed on January 25, 1993, not the 
"March or April" 1993 period that the Lessor's counsel mistakenly 
identified. (Tr. of September 8, 1993 Hearing at 7.) 
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Lessor to provide the Lessee with unequivocal advance notice of its 
decision to tolerate no further delinquencies. "Repeated warnings 
without their strict enforcement are, of course, indicative of a 
willingness to waive that strict performance . . . . M Pacific 
Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748, 751 (Utah 1948). 
Moreover, "if the lessor receives rent from the lessee after 
full notice or knowledge of the broken covenant or condition, he 
cannot thereafter assert his rights of forfeiture given by the 
lease, notwithstanding express denial of the waiver upon acceptance 
of the rent." Woodland Theaters, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain 
Theaters, Inc. , 506 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1977). "The acceptance of 
even a part payment [such as the Lessee's payment of the June 1993 
installment] is a recognition of and reinstatement of the lease." 
Gay v. American Oil Co., 133 So.2d 612 (Ga. 1967). Accord Babb's, 
Inc. v. Babb, 169 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa 1969); Credit, Inc. v. Kutzik, 
159 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Minn. 1966). The Lessor's casual assertion 
that the Lessor " . . . accepted [the June 1993 installment] in 
mitigation of its damages," (Appellee's Brief at 23, n.15) ignores 
the clear significance of this principle. The Lessor's acceptance 
of the June installment is, as a matter of law, conclusive evidence 
of a continuation of the parties' Lease Agreement—a continuation 
that could be terminated only through reasonable advance notice. 
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C. THE LESSOR DID NOT PROVIDE THE LESSEE WITH REASONABLE NOTICE 
OF ITS INTENT TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PAYMENT TERMS OF 
THE LEASE AND MEMORANDUM. 
The Lessor suggests that even if it temporarily waived its 
right to timely payment under the Lease Agreement and the 
Memorandum, it subsequently provided—through its Notice to Quit 
and unlawful detainer complaint—reasonable notice of its intent to 
require strict compliance in the future. (Appellee's Brief at 28-
30.) That argument, however, misconceives controlling Utah law. 
Utah law requires a promisee who has induced its promisor to 
believe that strict performance will not be required to provide the 
promisor with reasonable, advance notice before it can insist on 
strict performance. (See Appellant's Brief at 8-11, and Reply 
Brief at 8, supra.) This is designed to prevent the promisee from 
suddenly and unexpectedly requiring strict performance with 
contractual terms that historically have been waived by action or 
inaction. Id. The law, therefore, focuses on the safeguards that 
the promisee must employ before forfeiture is sought to assure that 
the promisor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lessee's departure 
from previous practice. Id. For that reason, once the promisee 
decides, without advance warning, to require strict compliance, the 
limited cure period available to the promisor after that decision 
is made is legally irrelevant. Under Utah law, the Lessee was and 
is entitled to reasonable advance notice before the Lessor elected 
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to pull the forfeiture trigger. The Lessor's failure to provide 
such notice is fatal to its forfeiture claim. The district court's 
decision to the contrary must be reversed. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in ruling that the Lessor did not waive 
its right to require strict performance in the Lessee's payment of 
rent. This Court should hold the Lessor to the clear intent of its 
own conduct by vacating the trial court's Order of Restitution and 
Final Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this / 7 day of June, 1994. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John TV Anderson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
M 
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